Summary of influences that led to introduction of frontal airbags on US passenger vehicles.

OBJECTIVE: The history of airbags for occupant protection in frontal crashes is reviewed from the perspective of a former Senior Executive at NHTSA from the early 1970's to the late 1980's. This paper summarizes the factors that led to regulatory delays as well as those that led to voluntary adoption of airbags by several manufacturers. METHODS: The regulatory history and interactions with airbag suppliers and vehicle manufactures is recounted citing key steps in the evolution of frontal airbags. RESULTS: When the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Standard 208, "Occupant Protection" was issued on July 2, 1969 the Safety Agency anticipated that the industry response would provide automatic frontal crash protection from airbags that deployed to protect all front seat occupants from injury in severe frontal crashes. It was not until, September 1, 1998 that airbags were required in all cars and light trucks. The interim 29 years involved a series of stops and starts during which most of the original airbag suppliers lost interest and abandoned the airbag market. The issues associated with airbags and their place in Standard 208 were directly influenced by interventions from the President, the Congress, the Supreme Court, Secretaries of Transportation, NHTSA Administrators, the Presidents of US Auto Companies and Senior Executives of Insurance Companies. CONCLUSION: In 1966, there was support from the US auto industry for a single source of safety regulations that apply to new vehicles sold in the US. This is evidenced by the unanimous passage by the House of Representatives and Senate of the Law that created the Federal auto safety regulatory framework. The Law also required seatbelts in new cars and prohibited States from making separate safety rules. However, the large safety benefits offered by seatbelts were negated because they were rarely used. Consequently, finding ways of providing high levels of protection without requiring action by occupants became a goal of the new Safety Agency. The airbag offered the possibility of achieving that goal.From the initial airbag notice of proposed rulemaking on July 2, 1969, Safety Agency required 2 years to resolve objections before a final Standard 208 could be issued (on July 8,1971). The subsequent industry opposition to the Standard 208 employed Presidential influence and Court suits to cause a 5½ year delay until the Coleman Decision on December 6, 1976. Changes in regulatory approach of the Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations and associated Court suits caused another 7½ year delay until the Dole Decision on July 17, 1984. It required another 7 ½, until December 18, 1991, for market forces to reduce industry opposition to airbags and permit Congress to pass a law that mandated them. Another 6½ years of lead time was required before all cars and light trucks were required to meet the airbag standard. During the mid and late 1980's vehicle safety ratings, seatbelt use laws, and Vince and Larry PSA's had all acted to increase safety awareness and safety belt use. Consequently, added public demand for vehicle safety features slowly developed. Changes in economic incentives encouraged a number of vehicle lines to install driver airbags as standard equipment and the feature was being widely advertised by Chrysler. This combination of events made it possible for Congress to pass and President Bush 41 to sign legislation requiring airbags in cars and light trucks by September 1, 1998 - more than 29 years after the initial rulemaking notice in 1969.

Impact and injury patterns in between-rails frontal crashes of vehicles with good ratings for frontal crash protection.

This research investigated (1) what are the key attributes of the between-rail, frontal crash, (2) what are the types of object contacted, and (3) what is the type of resulting trauma. The method was to study with both weighted and in-depth case reviews of NASS-CDS crash data with direct damage between the longitudinal rails in frontal crashes. Individual case selection was limited to belted occupants in between-rail, frontal impacts of good-rated, late-model vehicles equipped with air bags.This paper evaluates the risk of trauma for drivers in cars and LTVs in between-rail, frontal crashes, and suggests the between-rail impact is more dangerous to car drivers. Using weighted data-representing 227,305 tow-away crashes-the resulting trauma to various body regions was analyzed to suggest greatest injury is to the chest, pelvis/thigh/knee/leg, and foot/ankle. This study analyzed the type of object that caused the direct damage between the rails, including small tree or post, large tree or pole, and another vehicle; and found that the struck object was most often another vehicle or a large tree/pole. Both the extent of damage and the occupant compartment intrusion were explored, and suggest that 64% of the serious injuries are associated with increasing intrusion. Individual NASS cases were reviewed to gain a deeper understanding of the mechanical particulars in the between-rail crash.

Mechanisms of traumatic rupture of the aorta and associated peri-isthmic motion and deformation.

This study investigated the mechanisms of traumatic rupture of the aorta (TRA). Eight unembalmed human cadavers were tested using various dynamic blunt loading modes. Impacts were conducted using a 32-kg impactor with a 152-mm face, and high-speed seatbelt pretensioners. High-speed biplane x-ray was used to visualize aortic motion within the mediastinum, and to measure deformation of the aorta. An axillary thoracotomy approach was used to access the peri-isthmic region to place radiopaque markers on the aorta. The cadavers were inverted for testing. Clinically relevant TRA was observed in seven of the tests. Peak average longitudinal Lagrange strain was 0.644, with the average peak for all tests being 0.208 +/- 0.216. Peak intraluminal pressure of 165 kPa was recorded. Longitudinal stretch of the aorta was found to be a principal component of injury causation. Stretch of the aorta was generated by thoracic deformation, which is required for injury to occur. The presence of atherosclerosis was demonstrated to promote injury. The isthmus of the aorta moved dorsocranially during frontal impact and submarining loading modes. The aortic isthmus moved medially and anteriorly during impact to the left side. The results of this study provide a better understanding of the mechanisms associated with TRA, and can be used for the validation of finite element models developed for the examination and prediction of TRA.

Comparison of PMHS, WorldSID, and THOR-NT responses in simulated far side impact.

Injury to the far side occupant has been demonstrated as a significant portion of the total trauma in side impacts. The objective of the study was to determine the response of PMHS in far side impact configurations, with and without generic countermeasures, and compare responses to the WorldSID and THOR dummies. A far side impact buck was designed for a sled test system that included a center console and three-point belt system. The buck allowed for additional options of generic countermeasures including shoulder or thorax plates or an inboard shoulder belt. The entire buck could be mounted on the sled in either a 90-degree (3-o'clock PDOF) or a 60-degree (2-o'clock PDOF) orientation. A total of 18 tests on six PMHS were done to characterize the far side impact environment at both low (11 km/h) and high (30 km/h) velocities. WorldSID and THOR-NT tests were completed in the same configurations to conduct matched-pair comparisons. For high-speed tests, center console pelvic forces ranged from 3 to 5 kN; thorax or shoulder plate forces (when present) ranged from 3 to 4 kN. Shoulder belt forces were highly dependent on the presence of a thorax or shoulder restraint; without alternate restraint, both inboard and outboard shoulder belt forces were approximately 3 kN. Both dummies had positive and negative biofidelity outcomes. For example, the THOR shoulder against a side restraint produced much higher forces than the PMHS or WorldSID; the WorldSID produced greater pelvic loads in the presence of a shoulder plate than the PMHS or THOR. Both dummies provided good measures of head excursion compared to PMHS across most configurations. Both dummies had difficulty measuring appropriate chest deformations due to belt loading because of measurement device locations. Considerations for countermeasure design should account for the potential for increased injuries to other body regions. For example, in the PMHS tests, a high inboard shoulder belt configuration produced carotid artery trauma. The far side impact environment is unique and there are currently no dummies that are designed specifically to assist countermeasure design. The current test series demonstrated that with some modifications, both the WorldSID and THOR have the potential to function as good human surrogates in far side impact configurations.

Worldsid assessment of far side impact countermeasures.

Far side impact trauma has been demonstrated as a significant portion of the total trauma in side impacts. The objective of the study was to assess the potential usefulness of countermeasures and assess the trade-offs associated with generic countermeasure design. Because the WorldSID dummy has demonstrated promise as a potential far side impact dummy, it was chosen to assess countermeasures in this mode. A unique far side impact buck was designed for a sled test system that included, as a standard configuration, a center console and outboard three-point belt system. This configuration assumed a left side driver with a right side impact. The buck allowed for additional options of generic restraints including shoulder or thorax plates or an inboard shoulder belt. The entire buck could be mounted on the sled in either a 90-degree (3-o'clock PDOF) or a 60-degree (2-o'clock PDOF) orientation. A total of 19 WorldSID tests were completed. The inboard shoulder belt configuration produced high shear forces in the lower neck (2430 N) when the belt position was placed over the mid portion of the neck. Shear forces were reduced and of opposite sign when the inboard belt position was horizontal and over the shoulder; forces were similar to the standard outboard belt configuration (830 - 1100 N). A shoulder or thorax restraint was effective in limiting the head excursion, but each caused significant displacement at the corresponding region on the dummy. A shoulder restraint resulted in shoulder displacements of 30 - 43 mm. A thorax restraint caused thorax deflections of 39 - 64 mm. Inboard restraints for far side impacts can be effective in reducing head excursion but the specific design and placement of these restraints determine their overall injury mitigating characteristics.

The blue ribbon panel on depowered and advanced airbags - status report on airbag performance.

In February 2000, a group of highway safety organizations sent a letter to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation expressing concern about a possible return to the 30-mph rigid barrier test using unbelted dummies previously required by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208. The letter asked the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to expedite data collection of the real-world crash experience of airbag-equipped vehicles certified to the 30-mph sled test using unbelted dummies because of suggestions that depowered airbags may not provide the same level of protection, particularly to larger, unbelted occupants. For the same reason, the letter also recommended that the auto industry commit funding for additional data collection and to establish a panel of experts to evaluate the data. In response, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance) committed to funding a 3-year program to be managed by an independent third party. A panel of experts consisting of representatives from thehighway safety research community, the National Transportation Safety Board, academia, medical institutions, and the insurance industry was established as the Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) for Evaluation of Depowered and Advanced Airbags and met for the first time in February 2001. The BRP also includes representatives from NHTSA and the automobile industry who participate as observers. The BRP held its first public meeting in April 2003 to provide an update of its activities and to summarize the real-world evidence on the performance of depowered airbags. This AAAM session will provide a brief summary of the public meeting.